be expected from a 1% increase in the IVU. This option was proposed as a "last resort" (sólo en caso de ser absolutamente indispensable) by the Puerto Rican Advisory Board on Fiscal and Economic Reconstruction. 10 Even though Puerto Rico 11 may not be politically ready to join the twenty-two states 12 that are already full members of the SSUTA, this does not mean that the Commonwealth should not make preparations to join, nor should it ignore the second issue, the serious revenue threat posed to the IVU by automated sales suppression technology.
Preparing to join SSUTA would entail adopting all of the non-legislative SSUTA provisions. These provisions would include rules and procedures on software certification. Taking these steps only makes good sense if Puerto Rico decides to move forward with the statutory harmonization needed for full SSUTA membership.
Zappers (cash skimming software) are a different story. This technology, when added to modern electronic cash registers (ECRs), is a global problem. Germany, Brazil, Quebec, the Netherlands, and Sweden are among the many countries that have uncovered patterns of abuse and serious revenue losses from them. Although there are no published reports that Zappers have been found in Puerto Rico, it is very likely they are present. It seems that wherever ECRs are used to record sales, Zappers have been found to be removing selective cash sales and allowing businesses to siphon off revenue.
This paper is about the threat that Zappers pose to the strength and stability of the IVU, and how Puerto Rico can move against this threat today by extending the certification provisions of the SSUTA to ECRs. In other words, it is not necessary to join SSUTA to learn from italthough joining might not be such a bad idea.
SCOPE OF THE PROBLEM -STUDIES & CASES

Studies
Statistique, Quebec (the central authority for the production and dissemination of official statistical information for Quebec government departments and agencies) providing a statistically consistent measures for the GDP for Quebec 12 The SSUTA was the product of the combined effort of 44 states and the District of Columbia. At present the 22 full-member states that are currently implementing the SST are: Aransas, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Michigan, Minnesota, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Vermont, Washington, West Virginia and Wyoming. Associate members are Ohio, Puerto Rico, Tennessee, and Utah.
The leading government studies of automated sales suppression are from Quebec and Germany. The UK is in the process of completing a national study and results are expected sometime in 2009. All of these studies focus on the restaurant sector. The German and Quebec studies both underscored the need for significant legislative reforms. Neither government has made the full studies available to the public, but a government-to-government exchange could be (and most likely should be) arranged. Summaries have been released, and the Quebec and German studies arrive at very similar conclusions.
Quebec. The government of Quebec conducted two studies. The first study gathered its subjects from the customer list of a known distributor/developer of automated sales suppression software. This investigation (the First Inspection Wave) examined 70 systems and uncovered 41 zappers.
13 A more statistically accurate investigation followed (the Second Inspection Wave). It was based on a random sample of businesses within the restaurant and hospitality industry. This survey, conducted by Finances Quebec, found that 16% of all sales went unreported.
14 This of course is a consumption tax as well as an income tax problem.
Both of these studies were relied upon by the Quebec Minister of Revenue, Jean-Marc Fournier, when he announced legislative changes, enhanced enforcement efforts, and a pilot project designed to counter the penetration of sales suppression technology in the restaurant sector. On January 28, 2008 he indicated:
Although the majority of restaurant owners comply with their tax obligations, the restaurant sector remains an area of the Quebec economy where tax evasion is rampant, both in terms of income taxes and sales taxes. Tax losses in this sector are significant. Revenue Quebec estimates them at $425 million for the 2007-2008 fiscal year.
be in the $150 to $170 million range. This estimate could very well be low. Puerto Rico is in large measure a tourist-based economy, and this is reflected the restaurant sector being the largest contributor of overall IVU revenues.
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Germany. The Interim Report of the German Working Group on Cash Registers indicated that the Group was "… aware of [technology-assisted] fraud amounting to 50% of companies cash receipts." 18 The Working Group did not separately quantify the kinds of technology-assisted fraud involved.
The Working Group's 50% observation is supported by a report made by the German Federal Audit Office (BHR) to the German Parliament in 2003. In this report the BHR appears to focus only on factory installed software. 19 The BHR concludes that the potential loss in Germany is in the billions of euro:
The Federal Audit Office (BHR) has complained that later models of electronic cash registers and cash management systems now fail to meet the principles of correct accounting practice when it comes to recording transactions … The risk of tax fraud running into many billions [of euro] should not be underestimated in cash transactions. 20 Both the BHR's observations and the Working Group's study are further buttressed by summaries from studies conducted by three German federal states. These studies are limited. Like the Quebec studies, they focus only on the restaurant sector. But, they too conclude that sales suppression is a significant problem:
One federal state is currently implementing a special "restaurant" initiative. Checks already made have led to average upward revisions of 46% of original turnover. A comparable initiative in another federal state resulted in over half the cases (54%) having upward revisions of 60% of declared turnover. Fraud amounting to 25% was detected in a fifth of the cases, and was as high as 5% in the remaining 26% of cases. A third federal state has found that around 45% of till receipts involving cash are subject to upward revisions ranging from 20% to 118%.
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Although restaurants are a popular venue for sales suppression software it is clear from Dutch and Brazilian investigations that grocery and convenience stores, hairdressers and butcher shops also have very high concentrations of automated sales suppression. Because the sales tax does not reach as broadly as a GST/VAT, this kind of technology-assisted fraud in Puerto Rico's grocery stores and hairdressing salons would impact the income tax more than the sales tax.
US Cases
However, Zappers are a significant income tax problem. Consider the two large US zapper cases -Stew Leonard's Dairy and the La Shish Restaurants. Stew Leonard's Dairy was a $17 million zapper-assisted tax fraud in a chain of grocery stores located in Norwalk Connecticut. This ten-year fraud was uncovered by US Customs when cash was found in large denomination bills packed into vacation suitcases headed for St. Martin in the Caribbean.
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The La Shish case in Detroit Michigan was a $20 million zapper-assisted tax fraud at the thirteen-location La Shish restaurant chain. The owner, Talal Chahine, remains a fugitive from U.S. authorities (believed to be in Lebanon) with a warrant issued for his arrest. 23 This four-year fraud allegedly sent its proceeds in small denomination cashier's checks to fund Hezbollah terrorists.
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Both Stew Leonard's Dairy and the La Shish restaurant cases were federal income tax investigations. 25 Related state sales and income tax enforcement actions commenced after the federal investigations were well underway. In the Connecticut case the sales tax impact was minimal, but in the Michigan case it was significant. The La Shish case seems to follow a similar pattern, although this cannot be stated with certainty. The only public information on the La Shish case is through court documents filed in the federal enforcement action. Nothing is public from the State of Michigan, although it would seem clear that along with the skimmed gross receipts would be skimmed sales tax. There is no record of a prior State of Michigan tax, or related search and seizure action. In a request for this information Mike Eschelbach, Administrative Law Specialist, Tax Policy Division replied: Therefore, based on these studies and American cases, it seems reasonable to conclude that zappers may well be siphoning off many multiples of the estimated $200 million IVU revenue from the Puerto Rican Treasury.
SKIMMING WITH ZAPPERS AND PHANTOM-WARE
Skimming cash receipts is an old fashioned tax fraud; a fraud traditionally associated with small or medium sized enterprises. Large businesses with formalized internal control mechanisms, external accountants, and professional management structures do not normally engage in skimming, 27 although personal conversations with auditors from Revenue Quebec indicate that this may not be a solid assumption any more. Businesses that skim frequently keep two sets of books (one for the tax man, the other for the owner). In its simplest (nontechnological) form there are two tills, and the cashier simply diverts some cash from selected sales into a secret drawer. A record of the diversion may be maintained, but it will be kept outside the formal accounting system. Businesses that skim rarely do so with credit card transactions precisely because these sales can be documented externally through the banking system. Skimming frauds thrive when the owner (or a close family member) is the cashier.
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Technology is changing how businesses skim. The agents of change are software applications -phantom-ware and zappers. Phantom-ware is a "hidden," pre-installed programming option(s) embedded within the operating system of a modern electronic cash register (ECR). It can be used to create a virtual second till and may preserve a digital (off-line) record of the skimming (a second set of digital books). The physical diversion of funds into a second drawer is no longer required, and the need for manual recordkeeping of the skim is eliminated. Because phantom-ware programming is part of the operating system of an ECR its use can be detected with the assistance of a computer audit specialist.
Zappers are more advanced technology than phantom-ware. Zappers are special programming options added to ECRs or point of sale (POS) networks. They are carried on memory sticks, removable CDs or can be accessed through an internet link. Because zappers are not integrated into operating systems their use is more difficult to detect. Zappers liberate owners from the need to personally operate the cash register. Remote skimming of cash transactions is now possible without the knowing participation of the cashier who physically Michigan law (Michigan Compiled Laws Section 205.28(1)(f)) prohibits divulging any facts or information obtained in connection with the administration of a tax, or information or parameters that would enable a person to ascertain the audit selection or processing criteria of the department for a tax administered by the department. According, we are unable to provide you with the information you seek. rings up the sale. This attribute of zappers allows the incidence of skimming fraud to migrate beyond the traditional "mom and pop" stores. Zappers allow owners to place employees at the cash register, check their performance (monitor employee theft), but then remotely skim sales to cheat the taxman.
While Puerto Rico has uncovered no zappers or phantom-ware applications, the Province of Quebec (alone) has brought 230 cases to court. 29 In the early days Quebec was concerned that the software that facilitated this fraud was US made and was sold over the internet for $500. 30 Canadian subsidiaries of US companies were early providers.
31 Soon however, the design and installation of this software became a "cottage industry" for local IT professionals. Michael Roy: Before the first warrants were issued in Audio Lab LP Revenue Quebec had successfully brought to conclusion an extensive investigation of twenty-eight restaurants doing business under the name Stratos. Each of the restaurants in the Stratos chain used Zappers. To dispose of the excess cash from skimmed sales (1) a double billing system was put in place with suppliers (to conceal purchases made in cash), and (2) Luc Primeau admitted using his software to assist these companies to evade $435,000 in GST and QST. They skimming $2.7 million is cash sales. Mr. Primeau was fined $20,000 for his involvement. However, Mr. Primeau was more than a Zapper salesman, he considered himself a provider of management services (admittedly focused on how to "manage Zappers") for which he also charged a fee. Revenue Quebec determined that not only did Mr. Primeau fail to report GST 
SOLUTIONS -POLICY ORIENTATIONS
Globally, two policy orientations guide enforcement actions in this area -one approach is rules-based; the other is principles-based. 33 They are not mutually exclusive -degrees of blending are common. Rules-based jurisdictions adopt comprehensive and mandatory legislation regulating, and/ or certifying cash registers. Jurisdictions taking this approach include Greece and Germany. These jurisdictions are classified generally as "fiscal till" or "fiscal memory" jurisdictions.
Principles-based jurisdictions rely on compliant taxpayers following the rules. Compliance is enforced with an enhanced audit regime. Comprehensive, multi-tax audits (the simultaneous examination of income, consumption and employment returns) are performed by teams that include computer audit specialists. Audits are frequently unannounced and preceded by undercover investigations that collect data to be verified. Jurisdictions taking this approach include the UK and the Netherlands. France has implemented a program of preventive audits that target technology providers. 34 A similar effort can be found in Quebec where the customer lists of audited technology providers have been used to roadmap later audits of businesses suspected of technology-assisted skimming.
Quebec is in transition between these policy orientations. Prior to January 28, 2008 Quebec was squarely with the group that preferred a principles-based approach. However, the Quebec Minister of Revenue, Jean-Marc Fournier, announced 35 
that by late 2009 the MRQ will begin testing the module d'enregistrement des ventes (MEV).
36 The MEV will be used only in the restaurant sector. By 2010 or 2011 MEVs will be mandatory in all Quebec restaurants, where they will assure accuracy and retention of business records within electronic cash registers (ECRs).
The US is particularly hampered in its approach to zappers -federal income tax audits are not well coordinated with state and local retail sales tax audits. In addition, federal computer audit specialists are not normally assigned to audits of small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs), and this is where the zappers are. companies where he sold, installed and managed his Zappers. These funds probably needed to be kept "hidden" (to facilitate the overall success of the fraud), and in a sense represented his "share" of the skimmed profits. 33 Nevertheless, if Puerto Rico wanted to tackle this problem it could apply a uniquely American solution -blending rules and principles based solutions in a simple extension of SSUTA principles. 37 Under a SSUTA structure certified third party software providers (CSPs) 38 could be tasked with assuring ECR accuracy. Not only is the SSUTA legal framework operational, but at present levels of technology a CSP could readily assure the Commonwealth that ECRs were accurately recording sales, that the correct IVU was being collected by the business, and that it was properly remitted. At the same time the corporate income tax auditors could be assured that zappers were not being used to underreport income. Certification of the CSP could be undertaken by the Puerto Rican Treasury.
SOLUTIONS -PRESENT APPLICATIONS
The final part of this article will describe four solutions to the zapper problem. The traditional fiscal till solution (employed by Greece) will be contrasted with the traditional principles-based solution (employed by the Netherlands). Because Germany will conclude the development of a smart card this year, the German approach will be considered next. The final option is the SSUTA extension.
GREECE
Greece has had comprehensive, rules-based fiscal till legislation in place for over twenty years. Technical specifications for Fiscal Electronic Devices (FEDs) were published widely in 2004. These rules provide complete ECR data security.
All Greek ECRs are certified. It is illegal to operate a business with a non-certified cash register. All technical specifications for certification are set out in Greek law. It is a very simple matter for an auditor to determine if a specific ECR has been tampered with. Factory-installed phantom-ware must be removed before certification. If a self-help version of phantom-ware 39 is on the ECR it will either be blocked or, or there will be a record of the manipulation so that its impact on revenues will be neutralized. Data from all transactions are preserved and SHA-1 encrypted in the fiscal memory. Use of an add-on zapper will be a violation of the licensing regulations, and it will be detected in the same manner as self-help phantom-ware. Twenty years of experience in this field has given the Greek tax administration a wealth of knowledge about ECR security, but it has resulted in a somewhat complex system when seen from the outside. A rough understanding of the Greek system requires the reader to distinguish among a number of acronyms -in addition to FEDs there are FECRs, AFED Printers, and FESDs.
FECRs; AFED Printers; FESDs
Under Greek rules FEDs are divided into two categories: (a) fiscal electronic cash registers (FECR) which are accompanied by autonomous fiscal electronic device printers (AFED Printers), and (b) fiscal electronic signing devices (FESDs). The first are used only in B2C transactions; the second may be used in B2C or B2B transaction. Both digitally sign tax-related documents.
FECRs and AFED Printers. Fiscal electronic cash register (FECR) is a term that includes ordinary stand-alone cash registers, and cash registers equipped with advanced connection capabilities (network or PC operated machines). Autonomous fiscal electronic device printers (AFED Printers) are fiscal printers that operate only via a connected computer. They have no keyboard or display terminal. They do more than just print receipts however. AFED Printers store and secure in their fiscal memory the data that has passed through them (revenue from sales, and taxes collected).
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Data from the electronic journal memory is signed by a secure hash algorithm (SHA-1).
42
This hash value is permanently safeguarded and stored in the fiscal memory. Daily sums (receipts and VAT amounts) are saved into the fiscal memory, cumulatively and on a daily basis. This function essentially preserves the X and the Z Reports along with the Electronic Journal. . 1961) . 41 The FECR and AFED Printers must be equipped with either a 2-roll paper printing station, or a 1-roll paper slip printer station as well as a daily Electronic Journal (EJ) memory. [EJ memory is different from fiscal memory. EJ memory stores all information slips and tickets ("legal receipts") from the issuance of the previous Z Report until the issuance of the next Z Report. It is sometimes called the Temporary Daily Slip Storage Memory (TDSSM). "Fiscal memory" on the other hand, is the basic secure element in the Greek system. It is based on a ROM -Read Only Memory -chip that is securely placed within the fiscal cash register. Into this memory all important fiscal data is stored.] EJ memory is either pluggable/unpluggable or fixed. It resides in the fiscal device and is always a flash memory. 42 The Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA-1) was developed by the US National Institute of Standards and Technology. SHA-1 is a widely accepted data encryption tool. It produces a 40-character string by hexadecimal symbols (20 bytes FESDs. Under Greek rules a business owner can choose to use either a FECR (an ordinary, inexpensive certified cash register), or a fiscal electronic signing device (FESD). If an FESD is selected it probably means that the owner has capabilities, technology skills or a budget allocation that would allow the use of a sophisticated computer system. FESDs are designed for B2B applications. They are used primarily to e-sign invoices, but can be used for any tax document including a final retail receipt. FESDs are connected to an entrepreneur's computer system via a dedicated port (RS-232; Ethernet RJ-45; USB). A driver must be installed to allow the computer system to interface with the FESD. Essentially, the FESD functions as a virtual printer allowing the entrepreneur's back office software (ERP system or accounting software package) to function normally. However, every tax document required to be signed is diverted through the interface to the FESD where a signature is created (the SHA-1 algorithm is applied) and a hash value is transmitted to (and printed on) each document. The whole-day hash value is permanently saved in the FESD's fiscal memory. 43 This preserves all data on the document in detail.
Presently the cost of an FESD is between € 450 and € 650. Thus, a FESD alone can cost more than a FECR, and for this reason smaller businesses do not normally use FESDs to issue legal receipts. 44 Economies of scale also come into the picture because a single FESD can support many cash registers linked on a network. It can be installed remotely (even in another city), and need not be directly connected to the point of sale terminal.
The Greek experience is an important template for Puerto Rico. The Puerto Rican Advisory Board on Fiscal and Economic Reconstruction recommends that the Commonwealth adopt fiscal printers and a receipt lottery system. The lottery encourages consumers to demand receipts issued by the fiscal printer and thereby channels B2C sales through certified cash registers where the IVU will be recorded. 45 It is not clear if the Advisory Board is considering a device like the AFED Printer, or like the FESD. The Board does suggest that the government will bear the costs of this system (unlike the Greek system which is a business cost), and it seems to suggest that the system would be adopted for B2C transactions even though there is a B2B component that also needs to be certified.
THE NETHERLANDS: COMPREHENSIVE TRADITIONAL AUDITS
The Netherlands is a principles-based jurisdiction, relying only on traditional audits to detect sales suppression technology. Fiscal till jurisdictions, like Greece, also must rely on audits, but not to the same extent and certainly not with the comprehensive scope as the Dutch. 43 From a hardware and a security perspective, there is very little difference between an AEFD Printer (with an electronic journal) and a FESD. 44 In an effort to mitigate the cost of FESDs the tax law allows owners to depreciate FESDs as fixed assets over three years. There is also a government loan program to assist in the purchase of all FEDs (FCRs; AEFD Printers; FESDs). The interest on these loans is subsidized at 3%. 45 See supra note 10, at 26.
The Netherlands is clearly at the other extreme. The Dutch are convinced that audits (alone) are sufficient. They reject fiscal till technology. The fundamental emphasis in the Netherlands is on detailed, comprehensive, and technologically penetrating audits. Direct government intrusion into the recordkeeping systems of all businesses (encrypting the memory of all ECRs and POS systems) just to catch a few fraudsters is avoided at all costs. Following a pure principle-based approach to enforcement, the Netherlands feels it can rely on good business practices and compliant tax payers.
Netherlands officials speak about performing "deep audits" -that is, audits that are not focused just on the sales records in the ECR. A "deep audit" considers businesses comprehensively -it looks at income taxes, consumption taxes and employment taxes simultaneously and with heavy stress on the interrelationships among taxes.
The Netherlands has been successful with this approach. One of the best examples of how a comprehensive multi-tax audit can uncover data manipulations, and how this fraud is derivative of the symbiotic relationship that develops between SMEs and their ECR providers can be seen in the Grand Café Dudok case. 46 A grand café is a style of café that occupies a single large space welcoming a large amount of foot traffic and a large cash-based clientele, so it is an ideal business for skimming.
Dudok skimmed cash receipts with a primitive zapper and used a portion of the cash to pay employees under the table. The Belastingdienst (Dutch IRS) was suspicious of the low wages reported, and thought that additional (unreported) compensation might be being distributed (under the table) . 47 Testimony in the case indicated that on the second day of the payroll audit the managing director of Straight Systems BV visited Dudok where he was approached by the Dudok's owner-manager. Straight Systems BV 48 supplied the Finishing Touch point-of-sale cash registers that were used by Dudok. The owner-manager explained that he was having difficulty accounting to the Belastingdienst for the wages that were being reported, in part because the auditors were also questioning the turnover. The numbers did not "seem right" to the auditors, and they were requesting back-up data, something that would lead them to the primitive zapper he was using.
The managing director of Straight Systems explained the existence of a more sophisticated zapper, a "hidden delete" option already embedded in the Finishing Touch cash registers. This was, "… a hidden menu option that, after enabling …, allowed operators of catering establishments to delete cash register receipts from the system." 49 The most interesting thing about [Dudok] is that the discovery of the fraud was completely the benefit of a good and thorough tax audit. Based on our principle based law, tax officers were not satisfied getting the total reports and MS excel work-pages with total sales etc. They wanted the detail information of the POS. The tax officers persisted in their efforts to get the detailed information. This forced the entrepreneur to ask the POS supplier to help him out. Because [the entrepreneur] was aware that once the POS records were audited the fraud would instantly be clear.
Straight Systems was helpful by installing an additional hidden feature of the POS system. Records in the POS could [now] be deleted and the records renumbered so that no gaps would appear.
A thorough investigation of the tampered databases revealed the deleting of the records anyway. So this was not simple bad luck [for the taxpayer] but a good audit job of the Tax administration!   52 The court upheld criminal tax fraud determinations in the Dudok case under income, value added, and payroll taxes. Both the restaurant operator and the ECR/ software provider were convicted. Other successful audit-intensive cases in the Netherlands include:
• Microcraft Software which developed Analyse (aka, CX Analyse and Retail) as a management information system for grocery stores, butchers and bakers. It worked off a combination of ECRs and grocery scales. The zapper could be started with a hidden combination of key strokes, and the user could then indicate a percentage of turnover that would be skimmed.
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• selects customers to eliminate (for example male walk-ins without appointments paying cash without special services). 54 Thus, it is clear that an intensive and comprehensive audit approach works against automated sales suppression devices. There are a number of sizeable cases in the Netherlands and a much larger number of cases in Quebec that demonstrate the effectiveness of this approach. It is, however, very labor intensive.
GERMANY EMBEDDING SMART CARDS IN ECRs
The German Working Group on Cash Registers, comprised of the highest-tier central and regional tax authorities, has been examining automated sales suppression (both phantom-ware and zapper applications) in use in the country. An Interim Report has been released. 55 The problem is deemed to be serious, and a technological solution is entering the final stages of testing.
The German solution involves encrypting critical data from the ECR on smart cards securely embedded in ECRs Papers on encryption 56 by Dr. Norbert Zisky of the PTB convinced the German Working Group that encryption techniques had been sufficiently tested in secure communication settings with measuring instruments 57 that they could form the basis of a solution to zappers.
(4) What is the most efficient and cost effective way for a CSP to satisfy this standard?
The German smart card is the primer solution. It is far less expensive and captures far more data than any other option. The smart card is proven technology, and the CSP in a SSUTA context is a proven legal structure. Merging them in a CSP/ smart card solution makes a great deal of sense.
SSUTA was born as an inexpensive, voluntary regime to streamlines sales tax compliance. It extends audit immunity to taxpayers who used CSPs, because the CSP is trusted by the government. A SSUTA-like system to prevent zappers and phantom-ware applications in ECRs could be made mandatory for all sectors of an economy or it could be applied only in high risk sectors or maybe it could be made mandatory only for those taxpayers who had previously been found to manipulate sales records. Even though mandatory for some the CSP option should remain open for all businesses. This would increase the pressure on those who do not use CSPs to maintain good records, and traditional audit resources could be more intensively focused on this subset.
CONCLUSION
Automated sales suppression is a global problem, and it will only grow in significance. Solutions to this problem run from very expensive fiscal till regimes to intensive commitments of specialized audit resources. It is difficult to believe that zappers are rampant throughout the world and not be present in Puerto Rico. Revenue losses may be in the hundreds of millions of dollars.
Fortunately there is a cost-effective remedy -the CSP option. Puerto Rico has not become a full member of SSUTA, but that does not prevent it from taking an arrow from the SSUTA's quiver and directing it at the Zapper.
If Puerto Rico recognizes that Zappers are a (potential) problem, the immediate next step is to conduct field research -Puerto Rico needs an empirically valid study that measures the extent of the automated sales suppression problem. If Puerto Rico's study returns results like Quebec's and Germany's, then one would expect to find that nearly 50% of all the Commonwealth's ECRs are infected with zappers or phantom-ware. One should also find that estimated aggregate revenue losses will be in the neighborhood of 16% of total revenue (sales tax, business income tax, payroll taxes and personal income taxes combined). A compelling case could now be made for action.
Puerto Rico might also consider reading some foreign newspapers, particularly those from Quebec, or Germany, or the Netherlands and begin to ask questions when a Puerto Rican business is found to be using zappers overseas. For example, what should happen when Celine Dion's Nickel restaurant chain is raided by Revenue Quebec and each of the 32 Nickel restaurants in the Province are found to be using zappers? If it is the Florida Department of Revenue that is reading, then suspicions should be raised about the presence of Zappers in the two Nickel restaurants Ms. Dion owns in their State. There is no indication that anything like
